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ABSTRACT 
Given the corporate pursuit of discontinuous and breakthrough change, we work to deconstruct and 
shed understanding on managers’ failure to formally allocate resources to entrepreneurial activities that 
seek to deliver disruptive innovations.  Using an interpretivist approach with field data from two primary 
and four secondary cases, we show that managers’ failure to recognise the restrictive impact of their mental 
models – their implicitly held images and beliefs – regarding the goals of innovation and organisational 
development will lead them to reject opportunities with disruptive potential.  We design and implement a 
graphical Portfolio Management intervention to expose and overcome these maladaptive behaviours and 
find that managers employ up to five different ‘disruptive innovation rejection strategies’ when innovation 
opportunities are incongruent with dominant mental models.  The rejection strategies are observed to be 
driven by the psychologically uncomfortable emergence of ‘cognitive dissonance’.  We further ground the 
data in the often neglected literature from social psychology’s cognitive dissonance theory to generate 
implications for business leaders, instigating an innovative stream of research for those interested in further 
enhancing our understanding of the entrepreneurial pursuit of disruptive innovations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983) aiming to produce discontinuous innovations that 
disrupt and re-shape the exiting terms of economic engagement in established industries can provide firms 
with an opportunity to create substantial long-term value (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Carrol, 1985; 
Christensen, 1997; Timmons, 1999; Walsh and Kirchhoff, 2002). However, most managers overlook or 
ignore their emergence, focusing instead upon innovations that offer incremental or at best radical 
improvements to the performance of existing economic goods that lead customers (McDonald et al., 2001) 
desire and expect (O’Connor and Rice, 2001; Rothwell, 1995; Christensen, 1997; Timmons, 1999). 
Moreover, of those companies who have disruptively entered new markets (e.g. Apple i-Pod in digital 
music) or began as industrial discontinuities (e.g. easyJet in the European airline industry), almost none are 
able to systematically introduce further disruptions (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Kassicieh et al., 2002, 
Hamel, 2000). Indeed, understanding the way firms can successfully manage discontinuous forms of 
corporate entrepreneurship is not well understood (Acs and Audretsch, 2003). Our objective is to help 
business leaders of established firms to improve their management of non-sustaining innovation processes, 
in particular for the pursuit of ‘disruptive innovations’ as defined by the likes of Christensen (1997), 
Christensen and Bower (1996), Gilbert and Bower (2002) and Danneels, (2004). 
The current research focuses on resource allocation routines – since they have been identified as one 
of the key barriers to successfully developing and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities that conflict with 
tradition or with established market and business norms (Cooper et al., 2001; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Thomond, 2004). The entrepreneurship, new product development, strategic 
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management and psychology literatures highlight how managers’ cognitions and ‘cognitive inertia’ can 
negatively impact business operations (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; DeBono, 1968 and1988; Kiesler and 
Sproull, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992); and recent attempts have been made to locate an organisation’s lack 
of flexibility to support corporate entrepreneurial activities, such as disruptive innovation, in the restrained 
cognitive processes of senior managers (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2003).  Indeed, there is an 
emerging call for a better understanding of the impact of managerial cognitions upon the pursuit and 
delivery of non-sustaining innovations (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2003; White and Bessent, 
2004). Therefore, in studying the resource allocation routines of organisations, our approach is guided by 
the long tradition in social psychology of exploring the liabilities (and advantages) of ‘mental models’ 
(Minsky and Papert, 1969; Senge, 1990) and ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones and 
Mills, 1999). Of particular relevance to us is the how managers’ existing and dominant cognitive patterns 
constrain the organizing of resource allocation configurations. 
This article will firstly delineate disruptive from sustaining innovation.  It will then provide a 
background to the topic of managerial cognition from the perspective of mental models and cognitive 
dissonance and highlight its pertinence to the topic of disruptive innovation.  A three phase, 29-month 
exploratory investigation with six case studies will be described. It illustrates how the resource allocation 
issue was first investigated through interviews and workshops, then through a direct intervention based 
upon an adapted Portfolio Management approach, the use of which was justified by the results of the early 
phase of the research.  The intervention aimed to overcome maladaptive resourcing behaviours within the 
two primary cases, whilst deconstructing managers’ failure to allocate resources to entrepreneurial efforts 
that seek to generate disruptive innovation in an effort yo generate new knowledge.  Thus, our research 
aims to develop a better understanding of managerial cognitions that restrain resources to sustaining 
innovations and to provide insights and implications for managers on how they could overcome resource 
allocation barriers within their organisations in the future. 
 
WHAT IS DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION? 
Following the lead of the Clayton Christensen’s research (e.g. Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; 
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen 1997; Christensen Overdorf, 2000; Christensen et al., 2001; 
Chrisensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2004) and Danneels’s (2004) clarifications of his 
definitions, our research frames a firm’s entrepreneurial outputs into two camps: sustaining innovations and 
disruptive innovations.   
Sustaining innovations offer incremental or radical performance improvements that lead-customers 
(McDonald et al., 2001) desire and expect (O’Connor and Rice, 2001; Rothwell, 1995; Christensen, 1997); 
however, occasionally revolutionary breakthroughs occur with a discontinuous impact upon this steady 
state (Christensen, 1997; Dosi, 1982; Schumpeter, 1975).  Many discontinuous innovations are still 
sustaining in nature as they offer revolutionary leaps forward in performance improvement in the directions 
that lead-customers desire, yet break the steady-state as they are not expected to be possible (Christensen, 
1997; DeTienne and Koberg, 2002).  Conversely, there is a type of discontinuous innovation that we (like 
Christensen) term ‘disruptive innovation’: a customer offering (economic good) based upon one or more 
new technologies and/or processes that has enabled the introduction of new product/service attribute sets, 
which in turn have changed the basis of competition within a market by changing the performance 
dimensions along which organisations compete (Thomond, 2004).  Potentially disruptive innovations can 
therefore be viewed as threats to the prevailing status quo or opportunities for new forms of wealth creation 
(Danneels, 2004).  This article focuses upon managers’ pursuit of disruptive opportunities within 
established firms. 
Christensen’s work proposes that there are two approaches to the delivery of disruptive innovation: 
‘new-market’ and ‘low-end’ strategies.  A new-market disruption is initiated through the launch of a 
radically new offering for ‘non-consumers’.  Non-consumers are people who have historically lacked the 
skill or money to buy and use the mainstream offering of the market place.  Through a process of sustaining 
innovation and niche marketing, the new-disruptive offering eventually migrates into the traditional 
commercial space of existing industries. For example, consider eBay’s introduction of an auction facility to 
a new-market of customers who previously did not consume such services; and also consider eBay’s impact 
emerging on traditional auction houses. A new-market disruption therefore generates new-net-wealth from 
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ignored customers on the way to entering and disrupting an existing market (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). Alternatively, a low-end disruption is initiated through the launch of a poorer performing offering 
for low-demanding customers that have been traditionally overlooked and oversupplied by the existing 
market incumbents.  Though simpler, the low-end offering introduces new performance dimensions to 
entice low-end customers, in doing so investments are made into sustaining innovations and the offering 
eventually migrates upstream to disrupt the existing market structure (Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  For 
example, consider how Canon introduced simple table and desk-top photocopiers into small and medium 
sized enterprises, their simpler technology eventually migrated upstream as a low-end disruption to Xerox’s 
control of the high-speed photocopying industry.  Similarly, some new ventures can adopt both approaches, 
as the strategies are not mutually exclusive a firm that starts with a new-market focus may later adopt a 
low-end entry point in an adjacent mainstream market.  Disruptive innovations are therefore characterised 
by the development of customer offerings that to do not concentrate on the trajectories of development 
along which the market leaders traditionally compete.  As such, managers who exploit disruptive 
innovations will, and only if they are willing to be ‘be patient for growth but impatient for profitability’ 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003), be able to drive a disruptive niche marketing strategy 
that is under-valued by traditional lead customers and overlooked by industry incumbents, yet eventually 
able to reshape the existing terms of economic arrangement in established industries. 
There are many different typologies and views points regarding the dualistic goals of innovation, of 
which Christensen’s perspective is just one (Danneels, 2004). Regardless of the differences in vocabulary 
and definitions used by other authors, researchers understand that the development of innovations that 
disrupt and re-shape the exiting terms of economic engagement in established industries can provide firms 
with an opportunity to create competitive advantage and substantial long-term value (Acs and Audretsch, 
2003; Ali, 1994; Gilbert 2005; Tushman and Nadler, 1986, Christensen, 1997). Moreover, researchers show 
that the development of these discontinuities require very different strategies and processes from 
innovations that enhance and sustain the status-quo (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, Bridges and O'Keefe, 
1984; Kassicieh et al., 2002; Veryzer 1998). Researchers have also repeatedly shown that industry 
incumbents are mostly unable to generate, foresee or respond to discontinuous technological or commercial 
changes (Hannen and Freeman, 1977 and 1984; Johnson, 1988; Henderson and Clarke, 1990; Christensen 
and Rosenbloom, 1995; Tushman, and Anderson, 1986). Indeed, understanding the way firms can 
successfully manage non-sustaining innovation processes is of interest to both academics and industrialist 
alike.  
 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION, MENTAL MODELS AND COGNITION. 
Ansoff’s (1965) notes that “… entrepreneurially orientated managers would view the firm as a 
pattern of investments [options to which resources can be allocated] to be amended and changed when 
better opportunities arise.” (p131).  Despite this logical and calculating explanation of resource allocation, 
managers do not always act this rationally even when they see disruptive change on the horizon (Johnson, 
1988).  The Polaroid Corporation, was a world-leading producer of photography equipment from 1947 to 
1997, yet it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2001. Tripsas and Gravetti’s (2000) analysis of the 
Polaroid case reveals that the primary reason for the collapse of the business was the top management 
team’s failure to embrace digital photo storage technology and their embedded ties to the technologies and 
business models that had delivered past success.  The path dependent nature of Polaroid’s business 
development was found to be nowhere more evident than in its corporate executives’ decision-making 
processes.  Despite the fact that a team of Polaroid’s technologists had developed competencies in digital 
technologies the firms’ leaders failed to allocate significant resources and support: “Polaroid’s difficulties 
in adapting to digital imaging were mainly determined by the cognitive inertia of its corporate executives.” 
(Tripsas and Gravetti, 2000:1159).  Cognitive inertia had trapped Polaroid’s executive team into a focus 
upon the status quo that had prevailed for so long (Tripsas and Gravetti, 2000), leaving the whole 
organisation vulnerable to the destructive forces of disruptive innovation.  Thus, how managers allocate 
their time and resources is a complex dynamic, which is compounded further by its diffusion throughout all 
levels of the business, making resource allocation a difficult issue to manage and understand in general 
(Dougherty and Hardy, 1996), particularly when trying to foster the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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Many researchers “…are starting to see how the choices we make are swayed by a complex range of 
factors such as emotions, social context and uncertainty… [in fact] when we weigh up the cost and benefits 
of various courses of action, we do not just consider the material gains but also the social and emotional 
ones” (Spinney, 2004:32-33). Understanding of these less rational decision-making mechanisms has been 
fruitfully extended by those contributing to the study of ‘mental models’ (Minsky and Papert, 1969; Papert, 
1980), which are individually or socially constructed psychological tools that people use to construct, 
deconstruct and utilise knowledge (Senge, 1990).  Teams will often share mental models that are built upon 
the common elements of each individual’s mental models, but also guided by the dominant top executives’ 
perspectives (Senge, 1990). Mental models act as maps, at either the team or individual level, that help 
people to process information at faster rates, yet they also determine and influence the level of importance 
that is placed upon incoming information (Swan, 1997).  Consequently, a strength of mental models is that 
they enable people to create rapid and penetrating insights but a limitation is that in creating ways of 
seeing, they can also distort perspective and create ways of not seeing (Senge, 1990; Kiesler and Sproull, 
1992).  The notion that humans use mental models to assist with information processing leads us to the 
conclusion that “… the way we see our options can colour the decisions we make” (Spinney, 2004:35). 
Dominant mental models and, by consequence, patterns of behaviour are influenced by 
organisational memory (Senge, 1990; Lukas and Bell, 2000; Olivera 2000; Walsh and Ungson 1991).  For 
example, information and knowledge is said to be embedded within individuals, relationships, culture, 
processes, structures, archives and artefacts (Stewart 1998), all of these help to establish an organisational 
memory that influences decision-making (Senge, 1990; DeBono, 1988).  Hence, when management 
practitioners recall information and knowledge from their organisations' history, they are, in effect, drawing 
upon their organisational memory (Senge, 1990).  DeBono (1968 and 1988) offers the construct of 
psychological inertia to explain how and why people get trapped into ways of thinking and being, thus 
finding it difficult to change.  The effects of organisational memory can be paralleled to psychological 
inertia; both, it would seem, are important building blocks in an individual's or teams’ mental models, 
therefore affecting day-to-day decision-making. 
In sum, the notion of ‘mental models’ helps us to understand that people do not always behave 
congruently with their espoused aims; instead they behave congruently with their implicit, conscious and 
unconscious ‘theories-in-use’ (Argyris 1982).  Thus, mental models can be used as a lens through which we 
can consider managers’ perceptions of resource allocation options and organisational bias towards 
sustaining innovations.  For example, managers who anticipate dissonance between an opportunity and 
their established mental models are generally expected to react to minimise or completely avoid the 
perceived potential cognitive discomfort that this conflict is likely to generate (Senge, 1990; Kiesler and 
Sproull, 1992; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999).  ‘Cognitive dissonance’ (Festiger, 1957) could therefore 
explain why potentially disruptive innovations fail to garner organisational support because they are 
incongruent to the prevailing dominant mental models of the individuals with strategic resource allocation 
responsibilities.  For example, the case of the Polaroid Corporation’s failure to embrace disruptive digital 
technologies illustrates the power of strong, deeply held mental models, especially those of an organisations 
top management team.  Thus, a management team’s bias towards the status quo could be seen as a 
consequence of ‘cognitive dissonance avoidance’ (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999), where 
individuals actively avoid cognitive dissonance by attaching new values to the concept that is incongruent 
with their mental model, in order to generate a false assessment of the actual value of that concept 
(Festinger, 1957).  The result is the rejection of incongruent ideas in an attempt to alleviate the presence of 
potential or perceived unwanted conflicting emotion (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). Thus, mental models 
may not only generate a skewed perception that underpins the failure to see the disruptive potential in a 
new concept but they may also be a major psychological cause for the rejection of potentially disruptive 
innovations: “…many of the best ideas never get put into practice… because they conflict with deeply held 
internal images of how the world works, [as mental models are] images that limit us to familiar ways of 
thinking and acting” (Senge, 1990:174). 
The aim of this article is to present research that offers an enhanced understanding of resource 
allocation approaches that fail to support disruptive innovation as a route to corporate entrepreneurship.  Of 
particular interest is the impact of mental models and management cognitions within this process.  We 
demonstrate that prevailing mental models limit managers’ freedom of action and cause them to reject 
disruptive innovations.  An intervention was designed to help managers overcome this maladaptive 
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behaviour and implemented within two primary case study organisations.  An evaluation of the impact of 
the intervention is offered at two levels. Firstly, performance changes observed in the cases are presented 
and secondly, the insights garnered into restrictive resource allocation routines and their links to managerial 
cognition are discussed.  Our objective is therefore to help managers to improve their management of non-
sustaining innovation processes and to develop insights that will address outstanding gaps in the literature 
regarding managerial cognitions that restrain organisations to the pursuit of sustaining innovation. 
 
METHODOLOGY. 
In response to calls from the Academies of Management in America and Britain for research that is 
both academically rigorous and relevant to business practitioners (e.g. Huff, 2000; Tranfield, 2002), this 
research takes advantage of a collaborative academic-industrial approach inspired by the ‘action research’ 
(Reason and Bradbury, 2001; Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002) and ‘Mode 2’ strategies (Huff, 2000; 
Tranfield, 2002).  Our objective is to develop and validate ways to help companies to overcome the 
‘resource allocation problem’ whilst delivering a better academic understanding of the reasons for the 
problem in the first place.  Over three research phases, we employed an multi-case design (Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1986) using an action research approach for purposes that are best described as ‘theory 
elaboration’ (Lee, 1999), in that we elaborate theoretical links not previously explored in depth within the 
literature.  “The grounded, iterative, interventionist nature of action research ensures closeness to the full 
range of variables in settings where those variables may not emerge all at once” (Westbrook, 1995:18), it is, 
therefore, a suitable and justifiable epistemological and methodological approach for the investigation of 
resource allocation routines and their context bound nature. 
Case Selection. 
The current research does not aim to replicate previous studies; instead it aims to elaborate existing 
theory by generating new understanding.  Thus, theoretical categories were established to focus case 
selection (Glaser and Straus, 1967).  The categories were based upon a series of polar types underpinning 
the notions of the research topic (Eisenhardt, 1989; and Silverman, 1999) and therefore included: 
- a polar axis to represent of large, medium and small sized enterprises (definition, taken from the European 
Commission (2002)); 
- a polar axis to differentiate between service providers versus manufacturers; 
- criterion to ensure firm maturity and explicit desire for discontinuous change (selected as we were 
examining the pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship within established firms) 
Consequently, six cases were selected, the names of which have been disguised because of the 
sensitive and confidential nature of the data; all were mature firms communicating an intent to deliver 
breakthrough innovations: 1 x small manufacturer (Case A); 1 x large manufacturer (Case B); 2 x small 
expert service providers (Cases C and D); 1 x large service provider (Case E), 1 x large provider of services 
and manufactured goods (Case F).  Cases A and B, the two pure manufacturers, were selected as the 
primary cases as the innovation literature is skewed towards the manufacturing sector (Grandstand, 2000), 
providing the authors with a deeper repository of knowledge from which to draw and contribute. Although 
such qualitative case study research is limited to generating context-specific grounded understanding, 
highlighting issues of great relevance to those involved but without grounds for statistical generalization, 
the embodiment of a broad population of cases aids with the generality demanded by the research topic. 
Overview of research process. 
The process of conducting action research can be summarised into six key stages - data gathering, 
data feedback, data analysis, action planning, intervention, evaluation - and one meta-stage of continuous 
monitoring and feedback throughout the entire process (Reason and Bradbury, 2001; Coughlan and 
Coghlan, 2002).  The current research integrated these six features into three phases.  The objectives of 
Phase 1, completed in two months, were to generate a broad understanding of the issues faced by managers 
regarding the allocation of resources to disruptive innovations and to understand the types of interventions 
(or management tools) that may be more readily accepted by the firms involved in the research (Table 1). 
French and Bell (1990) illustrate that findings and data from rigorously designed research can be formed 
into corollaries and specifications for management interventions.   “[I]nterventions are sets of structured 
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activities in which selected organizational units (target groups or individuals) engage in a task or a 
sequence of tasks where the task goals are related directly or indirectly to organizational improvement.  
Interventions … make things happen” (French and Bell, 1990:113).  The action research approach enables 
researchers to implement management interventions, using knowledge and insights gained from their 
investigations, therefore permitting them not only a unique opportunity to collect new data but to witness 
first hand the relevance of their research (Reason and Bradbury, 2001; French and Bell, 1990). As such, it 
was decided that if a management intervention, which embodies the findings of this investigation, could be 
implemented with positive affect, then the knowledge generated could be said to offer industrial utility and 
justified theory elaboration.  Thus, the objectives of Phase 2, completed over nine months, were to design 
and implement a management intervention to enhance the understating of the resource allocation practices 
within the primary cases and to assist the participants to tackle their resource allocation barriers (Table 2). 
The objectives of Phase 3 were also two-fold.  Firstly, to assess and understand the intervention’s influence 
and industrial utility, monitoring it both immediately and over an initial period of 18 months.  Secondly, we 
aimed to enhance understating and elaborate theory regarding the resource allocation barrier.  Thus, the 
final phase involved dissecting and analysing the resource allocation routines of the primary cases and 
sharpening conclusions by obtaining and considering confirmatory and disconfirmatory data by presenting 
this analysis to the secondary cases and enfolding relevant literature.  These objectives enabled us to build 
insights and management implications in response to an improved understanding of the underlying drivers 
that inhibit resource allocation routines and the pursuit of disruptive innovations (Table 3). 
 
Table 1: The multiple forms of data collection activities utilised in Phase 1 of the research and the 
objectives of these activities. 
CASES 
INVOLVED 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
Case A, B, C, 
D, E, and F 
1 x face to face exploratory, semi-structured 
interviews with at least one executive manager 
from each case regarding resources allocation 
and the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
To build initial understanding of 
funding barriers within each case and 
to agree the research process. 
Case A, B, C, 
D, E, and F 
1 x three-day multi-organisational workshop 
focused on discussing the issue at hand, 18 
participants in total. 
To better understand barriers to 
resource allocation and to generate a 
view from managers of 
solutions/invention procedures that 
would be accepted within the firms. 
Cases A and B 2 x semi-structured telephone interviews with 
each primary case; plus numerous informal 
email communications. 
To gather in-depth data and present 
initial findings in order to iteratively 
focus on the roots of the resource 
allocation issue. 
 
Table 2: The multiple forms of data collection activities utilised in Phase 2 of the research and the 
objectives of these activities. 
CASES 
INVOLVED 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
Case A 1 x two-day workshop with senior executive 
team (5 participants), including tour of site; 
plus numerous informal email 
communications. 
Case B 2 x Telephone conferences with senior 
managers and engineers (4 participants in 
total); plus numerous informal email 
communications. 
To deliver more detailed 
understanding of resource allocation 
barrier and individual 
preferences/requirements for solution 
types; and to present ideas for an 
intervention format. 
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Case A 1 x one-day innovation project assessment 
exercise (completed by senior management 
team using a pro forma deigned by the 
researchers). 
1 x two-day workshop with senior 
management team (5 participants), plus the 
gathering of immediate post intervention 
feedback from participants. 
To implement a resource allocation 
intervention that will deliver a better 
understanding of resource allocation 
barrier to disruptive innovation and to 
improve the participants’ ability to 
overcome this obstacle. 
Case B 1 x two-day innovation project assessment 
exercise (completed by senior management 
team using a pro forma deigned by the 
researchers). 
1 x one-day workshop with senior 
management team (16 participants), plus the 
gathering of immediate post intervention 
feedback from participants. 
To implement a resource allocation 
intervention that will deliver a better 
understanding of resource allocation 
barrier to disruptive innovation and to 
improve the participants’ ability to 
overcome this obstacle. 
 
Table 3: The multiple forms of data collection activities utilised in Phase 3 of the research and the 
objectives of these activities. 
CASES 
INVOLVED 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
Case A and B Written presentation of initial analysis to the 
primary cases. 
Cases A and B 3 x semi-structured telephone interviews with 
members of cases A and B (3 months, 6 
months, 9 months and 18 months after the 
interventions); plus numerous informal email 
communications. 
Cases A, B, C, 
D, E, and F 
2 x 1 hour presentations regarding the 
intervention from senior managers of cases A 
and B to the authors and senior members of 
Cases C, D, E and F (2 months after the 
interventions) 
Cases A, B, C, 
D, E, and F 
1 x 1-day multi-organisational workshop to 
discuss the intervention, the insights generated 
by the authors and to clarify, analyse and 
discuss the implications (2 months after the 
interventions); plus numerous informal email 
communications. 
To conduct in-depth follow-up 
analysis. 
To ensure no researcher bias of the 
evaluation. 
To confirm and validate the insights 
and implications drawn from the 
researcher-led interventions within a 
broader organisational context and 
within the literature. 
 
Data Analysis. 
All interviews were transcribed, documents and emails were recorded and all workshops were 
minuted and confirmed as correct representations of the order of events by all participants involved.  The 
entire data set was entered into a case study database to facilitate the analysis and coding exercise. Data 
collection, data analysis, and conceptualization have been iterative (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 
1989). The data were analysed using qualitative data analysis methods proposed by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Glaser and Strauss, (1967).  Initially, a simple analytical frame was 
formed of a primitive, stereotypical resource allocation process, using existing literature.  The simple frame 
enabled the data to be grouped into simplistic arrays and analysed using a cluster methodology (Silverman, 
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1999).  The clustering enabled the lead author to identify common themes from which a more advanced 
grounded coding system was built.  The themes were extended with further data collection which was only 
stopped when a level of saturation was reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989).  A second 
reader, who was blind to the original coding approach, cross-checked the data, at no point was there discord 
between the second reader’s coding or the original coding.  Early insights, based upon within-case and 
cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989) were enhanced though the enfolding of literature, following methods 
for inductive theory development (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) and were then presented to 
managers from all six cases.  Exposure of the emergent thematic structure and initial conclusions to the 
collaborating cases allowed further confirmatory and disconfirmatory perspectives to be absorbed; this 
enhanced and sharpened the findings.  The current article focuses upon the recurrent themes that were 
elicited from the data regarding the rejection of potentially disruptive innovations, in particular the 
cognitive processes attributed to such acts. 
 
INVESTIGATING RESOURCE ALLOCATION: INITIAL FINDINGS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
PORTFOLIO BASED TOOL TO FURTHER PROBE MECHANISMS AND MINDSETS. 
The data analysis from the early phases of the research revealed that senior managers’ from each of 
the case studies reported perceived inadequacies in their current resource allocation routines that were 
primarily attributable to a problem of cognition rather than one of process (of the 7 primary disabling 
influencers identified all reflected this fact).  In fact, senior participants from each case recounted times 
when they had been presented with opportunities with disruptive potential and during these reports there 
was often little attention given to financial of formal mechanisms.  Indeed, the managers mostly focused on 
their recognitions and their ‘feelings’ of the existence of an inconsistency between the new opportunities 
and their current understanding of either the aims of innovation or their organisation.  These 
‘inconsistencies’ were reported to lead to ‘feelings of uneasiness’ and even resentment.  The existence of 
such conflict created a cognitive driver to employ strategies to alleviate the dissonant feeling, which 
resulted in the rejection of the potentially disruptive opportunity.  Furthermore, analysis of the data from 
Phase 1 and the first stage of Phase 2 revealed an additional six themes regarding potential approaches for 
overcoming inappropriate resource allocation routines.   
All these insights and themes were combined into corollaries representing idealistic specifications 
for a management intervention that could possibly assist managers to challenge restrictive resource 
allocation routines.  In sum, the initial phases showed that if managers could see how and why they inhibit 
the allocation of resources to disruptive innovations, then they will be in a better position to overcome their 
bias towards incrementalism.  As it is claimed by seeing wholes we learn to foster health (Senge, 1990), it 
was agreed with the managers that a visual tool, which can deliver ‘holistic understanding’, should form a 
large component of the intervention.  Thus the intervention needed to expose and explain the prevailing 
mental models that were at the root of the management teams’ resource allocation barrier and enable them 
to see differently.   
Portfolio Management (PM) is a recognised and trusted graphically based management approach; it 
dominates both academic discourse and leading practice as a mechanism to improve the effectiveness of 
resource allocation for innovation (Cooper, 1999; Hamel, 2000; Cooper et al. 2001). Despite the clear 
advantages of using PM techniques for innovation generally, PM methods, in their current form, are not 
adequately developed to encourage the allocation of resources to non-sustaining innovations (Christensen 
2003) and can restrict managers from investing into both small and globally emerging opportunities 
(Burgleman et al, 1996). However, it was agreed with the senor management from the cases that PM 
techniques, if adapted, could be designed to meet the specifications of the intervention as described above.  
Thus, our research explored the adaptation of PM techniques for the pursuit of disruptive innovations; an 
intervention process was developed and called the Disruptive Portfolio Management (DPM) approach.  
Like other portfolio approaches, the DPM was designed to provide an holistic understanding of innovation 
activity.  However, unlike other portfolio approaches, the DPM integrates a state of the art understanding of 
disruptive innovation.  It was designed to enable participants to understand why disruptive opportunities 
had not been easily financed in the past, and to help justify investment into potentially disruptive projects in 
the future. 
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The authors designed and prepared an innovation project assessment process called the dimensions 
ranking checklist (DRC); it was founded upon a series of questions and presented in a questionnaire format.  
Although the managers in all six cases traditionally favoured financial measures for assessing innovation 
initiatives, a concentration upon financial measures delivers the worst performing portfolios (Cooper et al, 
2001).  Therefore, the DRC had two objectives, the first of which enabled the managers to assess individual 
innovation initiatives on a range of standard Portfolio Management measures, plus a cluster of qualitative 
and quantitative measures focused upon disruptive innovation, in order to gauge the ‘disruptive potential’ 
of the initiatives under consideration.  Secondly, the DRC could be used to assess individual innovation 
initiatives at varying stages of maturity, from an early stage idea/concept to an advanced innovation project.  
The checklist could be completed as ‘homework’ by the relevant senior managers.  When the approach was 
implemented in Cases A and B, each management team selected at least 10 high priority innovation 
projects, and a small selection of recently ‘killed’ initiatives for assessment with the DRC.  The DRCs were 
utilised in an innovation project assessment session within each case, these lasted one day and two days in 
cases A and B respectively.  The output from the completed checklists was mapped onto seven large scale 
portfolio maps or “Bubble Diagrams” (Cooper et al, 2001), where projects were plotted on 1m2 X-Y axes 
against different parameters such as degree of technical risk, degree of commercial newness and so on.  
Four of the maps were standard portfolio management views and three were designed to specifically 
account for disruptive innovation.  The aim was to present to each of the senior management teams an 
holistic graphical representation of their portfolio of high priority innovation projects.  A DPM workshop 
was therefore designed to introduce the concept of disruptive innovation to the full senior management 
teams with responsibility for innovation strategy and resource allocation.  The participants were then 
facilitated through a review and discussion of the data presented on each of their seven portfolio maps and 
encouraged to consider the future of their innovation strategy.  The workshops lasted one day and two days 
in cases B and A respectively. 
 
OVERCOMING AND UNDERSTANDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION BARRIERS. 
An adapted portfolio approach may help overcome a bias towards sustaining innovation: the impact 
of the intervention 
The management teams in both cases reported that they now have, for the first time, a holistic 
understanding of the entire ‘innovation playing field’ – ranging from sustaining to disruptive innovation.  
Immediately following the intervention, the teams stated that they felt convinced about the importance of 
disruptive strategies and felt that they were more enabled to legitimise the allocation of resources to the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation; both cases reported this to be the case, although case B to a slightly lessor 
degree in the 18 months that followed.  Worthy of particular mention is the observation that the 
presentation of visual portfolio maps, when combined with the transfer of knowledge on disruptive 
innovation, generated an holistic view that enabled the managers from both cases to: 
 see emerging patterns in their approach to innovation and force critical discussion as to why they 
observe a bias towards incrementalism,  
 generate self-awareness regarding their dominant mental models on innovation in a pragmatic fashion, 
as opposed to being taught theoretically possible underpinnings for inappropriate resource allocation 
routines; 
 prevent one person or one project from dominating the resource allocation debate; 
 generate a better understanding of the weaknesses and strengths of their individual innovation projects, 
but more importantly to understand the overall picture and relationships of multiple innovation projects 
and their organisational bias towards sustaining innovations; 
 actively consider investing resources into innovation projects with disruptive potential, especially 
when a disruptive innovation is not framed as ‘bet the company’ investment but rather a low-risk 
initially niche venture, where its managers are patient for growth but impatient for profitability and 
quick to respond to emergent market needs. 
The management teams in both cases have continued the use of the portfolio approach; stating that it 
enables them to be significantly more focused on the task in hand in management meetings arranged to 
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discuss innovation.  The managing director of Case A summarised the feelings of the participants from both 
cases: “What we’ve delivered in these workshops in just a few days would have taken us weeks without 
your help, and we still wouldn’t have been able to see what was really happening”.  This positive feedback 
was reiterated in follow-up contact two, three, six, nine and eighteen months after the interventions. 
There were a number of case-specific observations that highlight the utility of the portfolio approach.  
Specifically, during the intervention Case A cancelled two projects and within two months three more had 
been cancelled or ‘frozen’.  Each of these projects were set to deliver sustaining innovations and had been 
stopped because of the top management teams’ acceptance of the fact that their core customers were 
becoming increasingly unwilling to pay more for enhancements to existing products.  The cancellation of 
these projects freed resources that were reallocated to concepts with perceived disruptive potential.  Three 
of these potentially disruptive projects were, in fact, options that had been terminated under their previous 
resource allocation processes.  Three months after the intervention, the managing director reported that the 
portfolio approach had saved them considerable time and money and had opened the significant potential 
for new revenue streams; after six months he estimated that the value of Case A’s portfolio had increased 
by 50%. 
Performance changes occurred more slowly in the larger case, yet three months after the intervention 
within Case B, the R&D group of their leading division reported that it had restructured its resource 
allocation arrangements. The division had ring-fenced 5% of their annual innovation budget for disruptive 
innovations and a further 20% for sustaining innovation projects of a radical nature.  This funding was 
diverted from sustaining innovation projects that were set to deliver incremental improvements.  The 
participants of the workshop continue to report that their improved understanding of disruptive innovation 
enables them to challenge biased resource allocation routines – although a recent organisational restructure 
has diluted the power of this group.  In addition, follow-up interviews after 9 months revealed that the 
process underpinning the portfolio management intervention had been enhanced and adopted into Case B’s 
quarterly strategic reviews of innovation. By month 18, they reported that their portfolio management 
approach kept them focused on a more diverse and more valuable portfolio of innovation than they had 
previously ever pursued. 
 
The identification of five ‘Disruptive Innovation Rejection Strategies’: insights from the intervention 
The analysis of phase 2 and 3 data has generated a deeper qualitative understanding of the impact of 
managerial cognitions upon the pursuit of disruptive innovation via a better understanding of the resource 
allocation function.  Five recurring themes emerged from the data, revealing managers’ employment of five 
cognitive strategies, all used to reduce the uncomfortable feeling of dissonance that accompanies 
potentially disruptive innovations, leading to their ultimate rejection: 
 
Rejection Strategy 1 
Rewarding incrementalism: 
It was observed in both cases that the prevailing explicit and implicit rewards had a negative effect 
upon managers’ decisions to fund potentially disruptive opportunities (where explicit rewards include 
financial incentives and promotions, and implicit rewards include a sense of belonging and respect from 
peers (Unsworth, 2001; Amabile, 1997).  The rewards reduced creativity and caused management to 
disregard evidence which suggested that the resources within their organisation’s existing and primary 
technologies or business models may be put to better use in opportunities differing to current practice. 
For example, in Case B, it emerged that job creation was an important implicit performance measure 
that was rewarded by top management.  Thus, the initiation of new product development projects for small 
niche markets, as characterised by disruptive innovations, gained little support in comparison to investment 
opportunities with familiar technologies that could generate immediate large scale job creation.  In fact, in 
the 1990’s, this implicit reward had driven Case B to incrementally increase the scope and quality of the 
specification of a contract with the US government.  Consequently, when the customer cancelled the order, 
because of policy change and major technological over-supply, Case B suffered a significant setback.  In 
Case A, explicit rewards were focused upon current production line enhancements – once again steering 
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management’s attention to incrementalism.  Moreover, both cases A and B appeared to display an 
‘Emergency Room’ culture (Allen et al., 1999), especially case A.  This was characterised by the existence 
of implicit rewards for the ability to conduct ‘rapid fire’ analyses of situations, where judgements need to 
be made quickly, along with prompt action.  When implicit rewards exist for reacting quickly, making fast 
assumptions and insisting upon quick action, there appears to be little support for suspending judgement, 
building empathy for new ideas and nurturing potentially disruptive concepts.  When such a culture 
dominates and is rewarded, creativity would seem to be reduced and new ideas are quickly killed.  This 
prevents ideas for potentially disruptive innovations from being developed or shared between individuals or 
across organisational boundaries.  The experience of cognitive dissonance when presented with a 
potentially disruptive opportunity can encourage managers to focus their attention upon prevailing explicit 
and implicit incentives as a strategy to reward sustaining change and to reject potentially disruptive 
alternatives. 
 
Rejection Strategy 2 
Ignoring positive aspects of disruptive opportunities and/or 
 removing the negative aspects of sustaining innovation: 
Participants of the DPM interventions, from both cases, admitted (in confidence) to past occasions 
where they rejected potentially disruptive opportunities, in favour of sustaining innovation, by removing 
the positive aspects of the rejected prospect and/or removing the negative aspects of the chosen initiative.  
For example, in case A the management team had recently faced a resource allocation dilemma between 
two dissonant project options:  Should they (A) increase the allocation of resources to a project that was to 
deliver a new high-end product in their existing core range or (B) invest resources into a project with 
disruptive potential in a new and totally different emerging market?   
 (Option A) The senior management were insistent that they could deliver new wealth generation by 
educating customers to move into the high performing end of their market (where they forecasted 
higher revenues and higher margins).  In doing so they ignored the evidence which showed that most 
of their customer losses were to be found at the low-end of the market and that the high-end was small, 
shrinking and already saturated.  Much of the customer base, it would seem, had been oversupplied 
with performance by the traditional industry incumbents and were now happy to purchase cheaper, 
lower quality, substitute products from China.   
 (Option B) Alternatively, evidence showed that the emerging market within the unfamiliar industry 
(although currently small with only potential for large growth) could provide Case A with a new high 
margin revenue stream.  Competitive intensity within the market for the new concept was low and the 
current players were ignoring non-consumers and low-end customers who were in a situation of 
massive technology oversupply.  Furthermore, the current players did not have as Case A’s 
technologies, facilities or competencies and would struggle to deliver the potentially disruptive 
proposition, which was based upon a cluster of simpler technologies. 
Despite the evidence the potentially disruptive opportunity was labelled by the senior management 
team as ‘too risky’ for two reasons: firstly, they felt the emerging market was ‘not yet large enough’ and 
secondly, they were ‘too unfamiliar with the emerging industry’.  The positive aspects of the opportunity 
with disruptive potential were removed and the lack of promise in manufacturing high-end products was 
ignored. 
When presented with a potentially disruptive opportunity, prevailing mental models may encourage 
managers to employ strategies where they ignore the positive aspects of potentially disruptive opportunities 
and/or remove the negative aspects of sustaining alternatives. 
 
Rejection Strategy 3 
 Focusing upon historical perceptions of success: 
“We’ve always been the world leaders in ‘product X’”, said the director of R&D in case B, “we are 
the best in the world, no-one can make those like we do”. 
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The more the authors interacted with the management team in Case B, the more they were 
comfortable with the idea that they could generate ‘disruptions’ in unfamiliar market places.  However, past 
success, with world-leading technologies, made many of them believe that they would not be disrupted in 
their current mainstream markets, despite preliminary evidence of technology over-supply in several core 
product categories (Christensen (1997) notes this is a key indicator of a significant vulnerability to 
disruptive change).  Similar evidence was present in Case A.   
It seemed that there existed an organisational memory, within both organisations, for the factors that 
have been responsible for past success and that this had become embedded in the cognitive processes and 
management actions.  Consequently, prevailing perceptions of success were preventing the managers from 
visualising or embracing the potential for disruptive change in their primary technologies and customer 
offerings.  Ideas that were incongruent with the historical paths of Cases A and B were dissonant to 
prevailing mental models and were deprived of resources.  However, it was observed in both cases that the 
notion of taking current technologies and competencies to unfamiliar markets with disruptive strategies was 
a more appealing proposition than ‘self cannibalisation’ (Chandy and Tellis, 1998).  Despite this glimpse of 
potential, the commercial newness involved in entering unfamiliar markets with such strategies was 
deemed high-risk, making sustaining innovation the preferred ‘safer’ investment option. 
Psychological inertia caused by organisational memory and engrained management routines, creates 
a focus upon historical perceptions of success, hence potentially disruptive opportunities are rejected in 
favour of alternatives that sustain the status quo 
 
Rejection Strategy 4 
Creating a perception of success in relation to high levels of effort: 
Evidence in the data linked to the amount of effort expended on current innovation initiatives, points 
to a cognitive strategy employed by managers to avoid potentially disruptive innovations that relates to the 
perception of desirability in relation to expended organisational effort.  Participant from both cases A and B 
cited examples of ‘prestige innovation projects’ where significantly large amounts of effort were being 
invested.  The targets of the high-activity, prestige projects were nearly always the improvement of highly 
mature products and/or next generation technological advances for familiar markets.  The data analysis 
revealed a correlation between the amounts of reported effort that management teams had invested into 
their prestige projects and the perception of attractiveness of the outcome of this resource allocation. 
In case A, for example, resources invested into prestige projects were targeted at improving core 
offerings, to retain market share and to remain competitive with insurgent Chinese rivals.  It was observed 
that in the face of growing year-on-year competition, managers committed increasing levels of effort, yet 
achieved decreasing levels of benefit.  Despite performance analysis, which illustrated that such project 
teams had reached the point of diminishing returns, senior management appeared keen to exaggerate the 
benefits of their high-effort projects, both in their own minds and to the rest of the business.   
In both cases the more effort the management teams had invested into their prestige projects, the 
more they sought to exaggerate the attractiveness of the outcome of this resource allocation.  Perceived 
attractiveness was, therefore, linked to effort and appearance and not always to measured benefits.  The 
perception of exaggerated attractiveness provides insights into the cognitions of managers faced with the 
choice of allocating resources to a project delivering a sustaining or potentially disruptive innovation.  The 
investigation shows that the experience of dissonance generated by the incongruence of an investment 
option and a prevailing mental model can be alleviated by deciding to fund a more perceptually desirable 
alternative. Hence, unjustly attractive, high-effort sustaining innovations can continue to receive resources 
to the detriment of potentially disruptive alternatives. 
The more effort that is seen to be put into sustaining innovations the more managers can be inclined 
to perceive the outcome as desirable.  This allows management to add consonant cognitions to such 
organisational behaviour and explains the maintenance of the preference for sustaining innovations in two 
ways:  Firstly, they appear to contribute to the grand historic effort of the business, and secondly, they are 
more likely to immediately require large amounts of resources and aim to deliver some measurable 
immediate benefit than a new potentially disruptive opportunity (which will be focused upon small market 
niche), thus increasing the perception of contribution and comprehensiveness 
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Rejection Strategy 5 
 Holding beliefs in the face of disconfirming information: 
The final rejection strategy employed in both cases A and B was simply the dismissal, refutation 
and/or misinterpretation of information that was inconsistent with the beliefs of the managers.  Case B, for 
example, had identified a potentially disruptive business opportunity in an unfamiliar market.  They had 
managed (on this occasion) not to succumb to the previously mentioned rejection strategies and a 
development project had been initiated, using a ‘slush fund’ and ‘borrowed’ resources.  The senior 
members of the project team kindly agreed to share their potentially disruptive concept with the authors, for 
the benefit of the current research and in return for a workshop that introduced a summary of best practice 
guidance and advice on the implementation of disruptive strategies, from academic literature.  
Concordantly, a one-day interactive workshop was designed and implemented with the senior members of 
the project team and an additional cross-functional support group from other areas of the business.  There 
were 32 participants in total who took part in the ‘state-of-the-art knowledge transfer activity’.  On 
concluding the workshop, 80% of the group who were non-project members reported that the day had 
contributed “high benefits” to their professional development, and their understanding of disruptive 
innovation (20% medium-to-high benefits).  All of these people reported that they believed the concepts 
and frameworks that were discussed would help the project succeed.  Conversely, 80% of the senior 
members of the project team reported their disappointment with the notion that disruptive innovations are 
generally more successful when initially launched with comparatively small projects for specific niche 
markets.  In fact, the distinct majority of this group dismissed the information and sought to persuade other 
participants within the workshop to do the same. They reported that they believed in the potential of their 
concept so much, that they hoped the outcome of their development project would be able to compete 
directly with industry incumbents in the mainstream market.  Hence, they simply chose to ignore the 
disconfirming information, believing instead that it was appropriate to launch a multi-million dollar, 5-10 
year project, using a mass market sustaining innovation model (this may suggests that the project 
management team were also succumbing to rejection strategy 4).  
Of the participants involved in this research that struggled, failed or refused to accept the notion of 
disruptive innovation, all could be considered as intelligent and diligent industrialists who wanted the best 
for their organisation.  It appeared that there was an instinctive impulse to overvalue the beliefs that were 
held by the bulk of their influential peers.  Thus, if an organisation’s influential majority focus upon 
sustaining innovation, it appears to be difficult to resist this path of development.  Both cases A and B 
lacked an active community of practice which could influence managers to embrace the notion of 
disruptive innovation, hence without an influential majority it came as no surprise that the concepts and 
frameworks were rejected by some. 
The psychological discomfort experienced when new potentially disruptive ideas challenge 
ingrained assumptions can compel some managers to hold onto their familiar beliefs and to misinterpret the 
potentially disruptive opportunity, rejecting it as an unviable investment option. 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION REJECTION STRATEGIES:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS. 
To investigate the validity of the disruptive innovation rejection strategies, we consulted senior 
managers from Cases A and B and the four secondary cases C, D, E, and F in a one-day workshop; 
literature was also enfolded from the fields of cognitive dissonance and innovation. 
When the participants began to discuss the recurrent themes from the data, there was some initial 
hesitancy and denial; these findings were reported to be incongruent with the images that they held of 
themselves or that they wanted to portray.  However, the trusting, collaborative approach enabled the 
workshop participants to be open and honest.  Consequently, they each beach began to ‘admit’ that they, or 
other members of their organisations, had utilised each of these strategies, both in isolation and in 
combination, when faced with investment options that were incongruent with their mental models regarding 
innovation and/or their organisations’ progress. Eventually, restrictive mental models and resulting 
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cognitive dissonance, not inflexible processes or financial mechanisms, were agreed to be the primary 
reason for the lack of formal resource allocation to the pursuit of disruptive innovation in each of the cases.  
Furthermore, despite additional rejection strategies being described, each could be deconstructed and 
explained by either one or a combination of the five that had emerged from the data.  Thus, the existence of 
the five disruptive innovation rejection strategies was ratified by the wider group of industrialists. 
The process of enfolding literature into the findings (as advocated by Eisenhardt, 1989) added 
poignancy to the emergent understanding of the rejection strategies.  The industrial ratification and the 
enfolding of literature have enabled the development of implications for managers who wish to foster the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation within their organisations (Table 4) 
 
Table 4: Disruptive Innovation Rejection Strategies: Implications for Managers: 
Rejection strategy Description Implications derived in collaboration 
with the industrialists 
Rewarding 
incrementalism 
The experience of cognitive dissonance 
when presented with a potentially 
disruptive opportunity can encourage 
managers to focus their attention upon 
prevailing explicit and implicit 
incentives as a strategy to reward 
sustaining change and to reject 
potentially disruptive alternatives. 
If executive teams intervene with the 
reward systems within their 
organisations they may be able to 
ensure the simultaneous pursuit of 
sustaining and disruptive innovations.  
Particular attention must be given to 
uncovering and changing both implicit 
and explicit incentives and rewards that 
undermine the pursuit of innovation 





Psychological inertia caused by 
organisational memory and engrained 
management routines, creates a focus 
upon historical perceptions of success, 
hence potentially disruptive 
opportunities are rejected in favour of 
alternatives that sustain the status quo 
 
The simultaneous pursuit of sustaining 
and disruptive innovations appears to 
be dependent upon an environment 
where managers do not feel compelled, 
either consciously or unconsciously, to 
ignore the positive aspects of 
potentially disruptive opportunities 
and/or remove the negative aspects of 
their sustaining alternatives. 
If management teams ensure that both 
they and their staff are able to see and 
evaluate the ‘true’ value and benefits of 
an innovation opportunity, regardless 
of its ‘type’, then they may be more 






Psychological inertia caused by 
organisational memory and engrained 
management routines, creates a focus 
upon historical perceptions of success, 
hence potentially disruptive 
opportunities are rejected in favour of 
alternatives that sustain the status quo 
 
Executive management teams and the 
stakeholders of organisations who see 
the pursuit of disruptive innovations as 
paramount to the longevity of the 
business, will struggle to allocate 
resources to non-sustaining innovations 
if the workforce is tied to its history 
and historical perceptions of success. 
If an executive teams can ensure that 
their workforce is proud of its history 
but not tied to it, core competencies 
may be less likely to become ‘core 
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rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) in 
the face of potentially disruptive 
opportunities.  Efforts to celebrate an 
organisation’s competencies whilst also 
preparing to both learn and unlearn for 
the future are likely to encourage the 
pursuit of disruptive innovations. 
Creating 
perception of 
success with high 
effort 
The more effort that is seen to be put 
into sustaining innovations the more 
managers can be inclined to perceive 
the outcome as desirable. 
 
Managers may become ‘blinkered’ by 
the ‘prestige’ that accompanies high 
levels of effort invested into an 
innovation initiative.  
If managers intervene with how 
success is measured in their 
organisation, paying particular 
attention to uncovering the false 
perceptions of success attached to high-
effort projects that are actually 
delivering diminishing returns on 
investment, they may be able to avoid 
wasting resources on high-profile, 
redundant sustaining innovations.  
Holding beliefs in 
the face of 
disconfirming 
information 
The psychological discomfort 
experienced when new potentially 
disruptive ideas challenge ingrained 
assumptions can compel some 
managers to hold onto their familiar 
beliefs and to misinterpret the 
potentially disruptive opportunity, 
rejecting it as an unviable investment 
option. 
 
Managers are often compelled to hold 
onto their familiar beliefs and to 
misinterpret information when deeply 
ingrained assumptions are challenged 
and psychological discomfort is 
experienced as a consequence; without 
unearthing mental models, it will be 
difficult to challenge them with 
disconfirming information. 
If executive managers uncover the 
deeply entrenched beliefs that 
undermine the pursuit of innovation 
that moves beyond the steady state they 
may be better prepared and more able 




The qualitative exploratory nature of this research has limitations.  For example, the investigation 
does not attempt to validate or qualify the relevance of the notion of disruptive innovation; nor does it 
consider the managerial reactions to disruptive threats or the impact of regulations that may predicate the 
need for disruptive change; nor does it produce findings that are applicable to statistical analysis; it does not 
produce objective facts or truths; nor can we claim any generalizations to organisations outside the research 
group.  Therefore, it does not provide all the answers to the gaps in knowledge surrounding resource 
allocation and disruptive innovation.  However, in our investigation’s focus upon mature profit-seeking 
organisations and their pursuit of disruptive innovation, we have facilitated the emergence of academically 
robust and industrially relevant grounded understanding regarding the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
using a collaborative academic-industrial approach.  Moreover, we have iteratively developed focus 
towards those elements of the resource allocation agenda that are most pertinent to the industrialists 
involved, all of which came from an expansive population of firms to represent the expansive nature of the 
research topic.  The methodology employed, therefore, has generated a relevant and meaningful starting 
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point for the continuation of qualitative investigations into industrialists’ pursuit of potentially disruptive 
innovations, providing insights that can be tested or probed in additional studies.  The enfolding of extant 
literature has also enabled us reduce the potential for bias towards any particular data set. 
More research is needed to qualify the origins and support structures of mental models; for example 
we predict that their relation to resource dependency theory would generate fruitful insights. 
A Portfolio Management (PM) intervention was developed in this research due to its obvious fit with 
the cases’ contexts and needs.  It was the transfer of knowledge regarding disruptive innovation and the 
visual ‘mapping’ element of the approach that was credited with so much influence, not strictly the entire 
process itself.  The PM approach is just one visually based tool that exposes how resources have been 
allocated for the organisational innovation effort; for example, another tool that is gaining industrial 
support and academic attention is Technology Road Mapping (Phaal et al., 2004).  More research is needed 
to identify the exact features of the benefits of visual mapping; this should also include an investigation into 
other techniques and their feasibility in tackling the resource allocation barrier to disruptive innovation. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
This article presents research that was undertaken with two primary objectives: (1) to explore the 
why corporations continually fail to formally allocate resources to entrepreneurial activities that seek to 
deliver disruptive innovations and (2) to help the industrialist involved to tackle this resource allocation 
barrier.  The cases have provided an excellent insight into the ‘resource allocation routines’ problem, 
highlighting the five rejection strategies employed by managers that restrict resources from disruptive 
innovations: rewarding incrementalism, ignoring the positive aspects of disruptive innovations, focusing on 
historical perceptions of success creating perceptions of success with high effort and holding beliefs in the 
face of disconfirming information.  The results of this research show that the barriers to allocating 
resources to disruptive innovation can be addressed, if the issue is framed in a pragmatic problem-
highlighting and problem-solving context.  Graphical portfolio maps can be used to illustrate an holistic 
view of the innovation activity and to create an understanding of the resistance to supporting potentially 
disruptive projects that is otherwise very difficult to achieve.  These holistic graphical representations 
contribute to improved dialogue and communication.  This generates more directed yet open discussion and 
prevents one person or one group from dominating the resource allocation process.  Holistic tools such as 
the DPM can, with positive effects, increase managers’ self awareness of their mental models and the 
impact of these internal tools when they are limited to a particular perspective.  It is essential to reduce the 
perception of risk surrounding potentially disruptive innovation in order to remove the barriers to resources.  
Reducing the perception of risk can be achieved through the combination of knowledge on the notion of 
disruptive innovation, an holistic view of innovation activity and recognition of prevailing mental models 
and an understanding of how these have underpinned the decision to ‘kill’ potentially disruptive 
opportunities in the past; all of these can be used to legitimise ring-fencing resources for potentially 
disruptive initiatives in the future. 
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